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violations,1 20 thereby avoided the consideration of "a complicated question
in statutory construction" 21 of the limitation periods prescribed by the two
acts. Why the diligence feature of the statute of limitations of the 1933
act was deleted from the statute of limitations of the 1934 act is not
apparent from the records of the Congressional debate nor from the Reports
of the House Committee on the bill.22 Nevertheless, despite the differences
in verbiage, the limitations of the two acts are substantially the same when
they are construed in the light of the weight of authority, which holds
that discovery need not be actual; but that the defrauded party "discovers"
the fraud at the time when there are facts available to him which would
have disclosed the fraud had he been in the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence.23 It is therefore reasonable to suppose that those charged with the
framing of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 were familiar with
this rule and that the diligence feature was purposely omitted from the
1934 act, as adding nothing to the act's effectiveness.
V. T. M.
TORTS-FRAUD--STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON NOTARY'S FALSE ACKNOWL-
EDGEMENT-[Missouri]J.-Defendant, a notary public, falsely certified the
acknowledgment of a deed of trust purported to be signed by Frank and
Mae Owen. In reality Frank Owen had not signed the deed, nor had he
acknowledged the same. When plaintiff, holder of the deed of trust, brought
suit for possession of the land after default in payment, Frank Owen suc-
cessfully defended the action on the above ground. Plaintiff, having suf-
fered damage, then sued defendant and the surety on his bond in the present
action for defendant's act in falsely certifying the acknowledgment. The
defense was the statute of limitations, on the ground that suit was brought
more than three years after the false acknowledgment. Held, for defendant;
the statute begins to run at the time the act is committed. Blair, P. J.,
dissenting, the statute begins to run at the time the fraud is discovered.
State ez rel., to Use of State Life Ins. Co. v. Faucett et al.1
A notary and his surety in Missouri are liable for damages caused by
the false certification of an acknowledgment 2 The special statute of limi-
20. (1934) 48 Stat. 881, c. 404, §1, 15 U. S. C. A. See. 78i (3, e).
21. Rosenberg v. Hano (C. C. A. 3, 1941) 121 F. (2d) 818, 821.
22. H. R. Rep. No. 1383 (1934) 73 Cong., 2d Sess., 28.
23. Dawson, Fraud and the Limitations Statutes (1933) 31 Mich. L. Rev.
591, 619. See also: Duphorne v. Moore (1910) 82 Kan. 159, 107 Pac. 791;
Wright v. Peet (1877) 36 Mich. 213; Coad v. Dorsey (1914) 96 Neb. 612,
148 N. W. 155; Johnston v. Spokane and I. E. R. R. Co. (1919) 104 Wash.
562, 177 Pac. 810; Ray v. Divers (1928) 81 Mont. 552, 264 Pac. 673.
1. (Mo. App. 1941) 156 S. W. (2d) 50.
2. Gill, The Missouri Law of Title to Real Pr'opertVy (3d ed. 1931) 182-
183, §316; State to the Use of Alexander v. Plass (1894) 58 Mo. App. 148;
State ex rel. Covenant Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Balmer (1898) 77 Mo. App.
463; State ex rel. Heitkamp v. Ryland (1901) 163 Mo. 280, 63 S. W. 819;
State ex rel. Matter v. Ogden and American Surety Co. (1914) 187 Mo.
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tations for actions against notaries public reads, "* * * no suit shall be
instituted against any notary or his sureties more than three years after
such cause of action accrued."3 The court in the principal case was there-
fore confronted with a question of statutory construction in regard to the
time when "such cause of action accrued." The general rule in both law4
and equity5 is that if plaintiff is deceived by fraud, the statute of limitations
is tolled and begins to run only when the fraud is discovered or, by the
exercise of reasonable care, should have been discovered.6 The same has
been held when a person, against whom a cause of action exists in favor
of another, by fraudulent concealment 7 prevents that other from obtaining
knowledge of the concealment.8 The question of what is a reasonable time
for discovery is one of fact for the jury, and not one of law for the court.9
There are two Missouri statutes which follow the general rule making
fraud or fraudulent concealment exceptions to the statute of limitations
and holding the statute in abeyance until the fraud is discovered or should
have been discovered.10 But the Kansas City Court of Appeals in 19031"
App. 39, 172 S. W. 1172; State ex rel. Park Nat. Bank v. Globe Indemnity
Co. (1928) 222 Mo. App. 153, 2 S. W. (2d) 815; State ex rel. and to Use
of Schaefer v. Korte (Mo. App. 1929) 13 S. W. (2d) 558.
3. R. S. Mo. (1939) §13364. (Italics ours.)
4. Bailey v. Glover (U. S. 1875) 21 Wall. 342; Sherwood v. Sutton (1828)
Fed. Cas. No. 12,782; Bayley v. Coy (1915) 195 Ill. 433.
5. Bremer v. Williams (1911) 210 Mass. 256, 96 N. E. 687; Tompkins v.
Hollister (1886) 60 Mich. 470, 27 N. W. 651; Witte v. Storm (1911) 236
Mo. 470, 139 S. W. 384; Maupin v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co. (Mo. App.
1919) 214 S. W. 398; Lightfoot v. Davis (1910) 198 N. Y. 261, 91 N. E.
582, 139 Am. St. Rep. 817, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 119, 19 Ann. Cas. 747;
Callegari v. Sartori (1916) 174 App. Div. 102, 160 N. Y. S. 931 (app. dism.
219 N. Y. 655 mem., 114 N. E. 1061 mem.).
6. A discussion of the problems in regard to this subject may be found
in Dawson, Undisclosed Fraud and the Statute of Limitations (1933) 31
Mich. L. Rev. 591.
7. An excellent discussion of this latter problem may be found in Dawson,
Fraudulent Concealment and Statutes of Limitation (1933) 31 Mich. L.
Rev. 875, where it is said at 880-881: "There can be found in the cases
innumerable statements that 'fraudulent concealment' involves affirmative
efforts by the defendant to prevent discovery. But qualifications are often
attached. It is said that the defendant's concealment need not be subsequent
to the original wrongdoing, but may precede or accompany it, provided all
his conduct taken together is calculated to mislead or allay suspicion. It
is sometimes added that all requirements are satisfied if the original mis-
conduct was of such a kind as to 'conceal itself.'" (Footnotes omitted.)
8. Manufacturers' Nat'l Bank v. Perry (1887) 144 Mass. 313, 11 N. E.
81; Wolkins v. Knight (1903) 134 Mich. 347, 96 N. W. 445; McLain v.
Parker (1910) 229 Mo. 68, 129 S. W. 500; Ferris v. Henderson (1849) 12
Pa. St. Rep. 49, 51 Am. Dec. 580; Hall v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (1916) 257
Pa. 54, 100 At]. 1035, L. R. A. 1917F, 464.
9. In State ex rel. Barringer v. Hawkins (1903) 103 Mo. App. 251, 77
S. W. 98 it was said, "* * * the judgment should be reversed [and re-
manded) for the reason that the jury were not required in plaintiff's in-
structions to pass upon the question whether plaintiff could have discovered
the fraud sooner than he did by the exercise of reasonable diligence."
10. R. S. Mo. (1939) §1014, which, stating actions which may be brought
within five years, says, "* * * fifth, an action for relief on the ground
1942]
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol27/iss2/19
284 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 27
decided that these statutes cannot be applied to the interpretation of the
notary statute because it is a special statute, and by another provision of
the Revised Statutes all special statutes are to be governed only by the
time limited in their language. 2 The fraud and concealment statutes may
not, therefore, be used to interpret the word "accrued" in the principal
case. The Missouri cases which have previously considered the question
of the time during which a notary is liable for his false certification are
in considerable confusion, and have held him liable both from the time of
certification'13 and from the time of discovery.14 They are, however, all
cases in the Courts of Appeals.15
The period of limitations for actions brought on covenants and warran-
ties in deeds of conveyance is subject to the fraud and fraudulent conceal-
ment statutes.' 6 It is difficult to discover any difference between the situa-
tion of a purchaser of a deed of trust who relies upon a notarized signature,
as in the principal case,17 and one who purchases realty relying on the
chain of title. Yet the legislature has not required the latter to investigate
the warrantor of seisin or run the risk of having the statute run from the
date of the making of the warranty. 8 A different intent should not be
of fraud, the cause of action in such case to be deemed not to have accrued
until the discovery by the aggrieved party, at any time within ten years
of the facts constituting the fraud"; and §1031, which reads, "If any per-
son, by absconding or concealing himself, or by any other improper act,
prevent the commencement of an action, such action may be commenced
within the time herein limited, after the commencement of such action shall
have ceased to be so prevented."
11. State ex rel. Barringer v. Hawkins (1903) 103 Mo. App. 251, 77
S. W. 98; see also State ex rel. O'Malley v. Musick (1910) 145 Mo. App.
33, 130 S. W. 398; cf., however, Revelle v. St. L., I. M. & S. Ry. (1881)
74 Mo. 438 where the special statute (§1710, R. S. Mo. 1879) was specific
and provided that the action should be commenced within three years of the
commission of the offense, and not after, while in the notary case it is
within three years after the cause of action accrued, which is something
different from a mere computation of time.
12. R. S. Mo. (1939) §1033, which reads, "The provisions of * * * this
chapter shall not extend to any action which is or shall be otherwise limited
by any statute; but such action shall be brought within the time limited
by such statute."
13. State ex rel. O'Malley v. Musick (1910) 145 Mo. App. 33, 130 S. W.
398 (notary certified a false deed); State ex rel. Fehrenbach v. Logan
(1916) 195 Mo. App. 171, 190 S. W. 75, (false release to deed of trust
certified by notary); State ex rel. Haitz v. American Surety Co. (1920)
203 Mo. App. 71, 217 S. W. 317 (false certification of acknowledgment to
deed of trust); State ex rel. Hardt v. Dunn (Mo. App. 1939) 129 S. W.
(2d) 17 (false acknowledgment of right of way).
14. State ex rel. Barringer v. Hawkins (1903) 103 Mo. App. 251, 77
S. W. 98 (false certification of deed of trust); State ex rel. Meinholtz v.
American Surety Co. (Mo. App. 1923) 254 S. W. 561 (name forged on
deed of trust certified by notary).
15. The instant case has been certified by the dissenting judge to the
supreme court, which means that the law on this point will be clarified.
16. Above, footnote 10.
17. The principal case imputes notice of all defects in every notarized
statement to one who relies on that statement.
18. This statement is borne out by: 1) R. S. Mo. (1939) §1013, which
reads, "* * * actions brought on any covenant or warranty contained in
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imputed to the legislature in its determination of the duty placed upon the
former-both should be subject to the duty of reasonable care.
R. S. S.
TORTS-LIBEL PER SE-FAIR COMMENT-[New York, Federal].-A Con-
gressman who had voted against the Lease-Lend Bill was the object of
three editorials in the defendant newspaper which questioned whether he
believed in the defense of the United States, or wished to follow the Quis-
lings' attitude of least resistance, and stated further that the dictators
were being told that Congress was split by radicals who could easily be
persuaded to oppose the best interests of this country.' Held: This pub-
lication was libelous per se as influencing people to think that the plaintiff
was opposed to national defense, in sympathy with the Quislings, unpatri-
otic, and capable of being controlled by sinister influences, which exceeded
the privilege of fair comment by touching the plaintiff's private character
and not his public character only. Hall v. Binghampton Press Co.2
In another case, the defendant newspaper published a syndicated article
asserting that the plaintiff, a Congressman, was the chief Congressional
spokesman of Father Coughlin and was, therefore, organizing opposition
among Ohio Congressmen to the appointment of a foreign-born Jew to
the Federal District Judgeship in Cleveland.3 Held: that the publication
any deed of conveyance of land shall be brought within ten years next
after there shall have been a final decision against the title of the covenantor
in such deed, and actions on any covenant of seisin contained in any such
deed shall be brought within ten years after the cause of such action shall
accrue"; and, 2) the fraud and concealment statutes (footnote 10, supra)
which apply to §1013.
1. The complaint was upheld as to only the first of these editorials which
read in part as follows:
"* * * It is difficult, however, to reconcile this vote of yours with the sort
of red-blooded Americanism which has characterized these valleys you repre-
sent since pioneer days.
"Sometimes we think that the younger generation is softening and some-
times we think the softening is not necessarily in the muscles. Of course,
you realize that by this vote you have raised a question about your attitude
on national defense and so it seems in order to ask you at this juncture
whether you do feel that this country should be defended against un-
Americanisms or whether you are going to take the line of least resistance
and wind up with the Quislings.
"* * * The one hope of the totalitarians is a divided America-a United
States wherein dissension and split councils are dominant. Reports from
agents in this country are telling Hitler and Mussolini and the Japanese
that we are a divided people; that everything is being done half way and
by compromise; that Congress is fighting the administration and that the
administration is impotent because it is honeycombed by radicals; that
Congress also numbers in its roll call those who are easily persuaded to
vote against the best interests of the United States. * * * " Hall v. Bing-
hampton Press Co. (1941) 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 760, 764.
2. (1941) 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 760.
3. "A hot behind-the-scenes fight is raging in Democratic Congressional
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